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Susan Sontag, in the book Styles of Radical Will, calls for a revision of ‘the 
project of ‘spirituality’’ for our era, encouraging intellectual engagement with 
the reinterpretation of this term through contemporary lenses, new thinking 
and innovative practices (Sontag 2002, 5). This book engages with this 
challenge and proposes an interpretation of spirituality through 
performance and the theoretical lenses of performance studies, post-human 
theories, religious studies, radical hermeneutics and phenomenology. It 
proposes performance as an inclusive lens of interpretation able to blur the 
boundaries culturally set for artistic, religious and scientific planes of 
existence, to ground the ‘project of ‘spirituality’’ in materiality, 
experimentation, creativity, imagination and the paradoxical.  
This is an operation aimed at opening the concept of religion to the ‘study 
[of] the wide range of experiences to which religious significance has been 
attributed’ (Taves 2009, 8): in other words, to what is deemed to be religious 
within the non-religious rather than what is religious because it has been 
institutionalised as such. As the religious studies scholar Ann Taves argues: 
   
we need to turn our attention to the processes whereby people 
sometimes ascribe the special characteristics to things that we 
(scholars) associate with terms such as “religious”, “magical”, 
“mystical”, “spiritual”, etcetera (ibid).  
 
Hence, by inverting the paradigm, it is conceivable to explore ‘the interaction 
between psychobiological, social, and cultural-linguistic processes in 
relation to carefully specified types of experiences’ (ibid), and consider what 
else within the spectrum of human behaviour can reveal insights into what 
we understand as spiritual, religious, mystical, numinous, sacred and so 
on.   
 
I consider theatre and performance to be significant in this regard, as there 
is a history of artistic experimentation with those areas of practical 
investigation. This is certainly a vast territory that might include, to mention 
only a few: the theatre of cruelty as envisaged by Antonin Artaud; the 
psychomagic rituals conceived by Alejandro Jodorowsky; Michael Harner’s 
core-shamanism; the Panic Theatre of Fernando Arrabal, Alejandro 
Jodorowsky and Roland Topor; Jerzy Grotowski’s para-theatre; Richard 
Schechner’s environmental theatre; the ritualistic practices of Anna Halprin;  
performance artists such as Marina Abramović, Joseph Beuys, Marcus 
Coates, John Cage, Linda Montano, Tehching Hsieh, and visual artists such 
as James Turrell, Wolfgang Laib as well as many others.  
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Within this broad landscape, I propose to look at performances/ 
installations inspired and devised specifically around spiritual practices with 
their origins in religious traditions. So, for example, Chapter 1 focuses on 
the performance The Artist is Present (2010) by Marina Abramović, devised 
around the mystical practice of reciprocal gazing; Chapter 2 looks at the 
performance CAT by Ansuman Biswas (1998), devised around the practice of 
Vipassana meditation of the Theravada Buddhist tradition; Chapter 3 
focuses on the installation piece Deer Shelter Skyspace (2007) by James 
Turrell, that recalls the architecture of the Quakers’ prayer room; Chapter 4 
explores the performance Journey to the Lower World (2004) by Marcus 
Coates, devised around shamanic journey practices; and finally Chapter 5 
analyses the pieces Pollen from Hazelnut (1986) by Wolfgang Laib, who has 
been inspired by Asian religions such as Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism, 
and has developed a practice for collecting and presenting pollen in gallery 
spaces. 1  
 
These artistic interventions are representative of a loose category of 
practices that I associate with what Susan Sontag, in the essay ‘The 
Aesthetics of Silence’, identifies as the via negativa in art or a negative 
‘theology’ of art’s absence in art (2002, 5). They resonate with religious and 
mystical literature, but also paradoxically with science and its experimental 
paradigms. This is due to the artists’ engagement with the creative process 
not as a means of self-expression, but rather, and to different extents, as a 
means of self-restraint and experimentation with levels of consciousness 
often associated with spiritual experiences. Art is therefore viewed as ‘a 
vehicle’2 for involving spectators/participants into levels of experiences that 
touch on that liminal space between discovery, experience, creativity and 
imagination, revealing the performance of those invisible, intangible human 
and non-human ‘others’ which are usually excluded from our perceptive 
fields. These ‘others’ emerge and enter the perceptive horizon due to a 
change of practices that by irrupting and disrupting perception, reveal the 
paradoxical numinosity of reality, leaving spectators and researchers alike 
puzzled, disconcerted.  
 
This is an artistic attitude that looks at ‘sketching out new prescriptions for 
looking [and] hearing’; at delivering ‘a more sensuous experience of art’; and, 
more generally, at offering modalities for focusing attention on overlooked 
aspects of reality (Sontag 2002, VI).  
 
 
Performance and Spirituality 
 
Although there is an increasing body of scholarly work engaging with the 
question of spirituality and religion in contemporary art, these terms, as the 
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historian Tomoko Masuzawa points out, are still largely treated within these 
disciplines as self-evident categories, remaining peculiarly ‘essentialized, un-
historicized and un-analyzed’ (Bordowitz, de Duve, Doniger, Elkins, Groys, 
Masuzawa, Morgan and Worley 2009, 124).3  
 
As Lance Gharavi explains in his introduction to the book Religion, Theatre, 
and Performance: Acts of Faith (2012), in performance and theatre studies 
the question of religion remains an uncomfortable subject of inquiry (2012, 
7). Although historically there is an intimate relationship between 
performance and religion, the same relationship has also been characterized 
‘by long stretches of hostility and mutual suspicion’ (ibid). In performance, 
theatre and cultural studies, although religions as we know them are 
cultural constructs that came into being at a certain time and under certain 
social and political conditions, the study of what constitutes the ‘religious’ 
and ‘the spiritual’ in contemporary culture remains a sui generis subject of 
inquiry (Gharavi 2012, 15). Therefore, in broad terms, this book proposes to 
contribute to the project of studying the ‘religious’ within the ‘spiritual’ and 
the ‘numinous’ in contemporary culture, employing performance as its 
hermeneutic lens. This entails articulating terminologies and developing 
ideas on certain ways of doing things, particular processes of apprehension 
and attitudes that, although often associated with the sphere of religious 
creeds, when contextualized and conceptualized in terms of performance 
might reveal a broader and more complex landscape: the horizon of the non-
human.  
 
The hypothesis proposed is that certain performative artistic practices 
encourage an interpretation of spirituality and religion that is highly 
paradoxical and often subversive of unified, monotheistic approaches to how 
reality is apprehended and perceived, and of binary categorizations of reality 
that separate matter from spirit, body from soul in discrete, fixed dividing 
boundaries. In other words, the strategies employed by the artists under 
scrutiny here are not directed toward the rhetoric of attaining ‘an absolute 
state of being’ (Sontag 2002, 4), but rather toward a sense of spirituality 
propelled toward the experience and exploration of the condition of the 
paradox, understood as a ‘form of speech [or] an element in (…) dialogue’ 
(Sontag 2002, 11) that resists the reductive simplifications of fixed binary 
thinking.  
 
From this perspective, it is conceivable to think of a type of performance 
constructed strategically as theatrical apparatuses resembling both a 
scientific laboratory and a sacred space within which to experiment with the 
complex processes of human perception and the multiple layers that the 
material world seems to reveal to different approaches and instruments of 
investigation. It is, however, in theatre that Biswas proposes the 
performative contradiction of an invisible performer; that Abramović plays a 
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multiplicity of presences, which are embodied and at the same time 
disembodied; that Turrell allows spectators to conceive light in both its 
physicality and immateriality; that Laib renders pollen agentic; and where 
Coates conceives the immanence of animal spirits. It is therefore in theatre 
that the technologies of the self employed potentially disintegrate in 
perception ‘the ancient notions of solid matter and clear and distinct reason’ 
(Paz 1978, 15-16), creating space for holding their indeterminacy, and the 
immanence of something ‘other’ in the unfolding categories set in our daily 
life. And it is, again, in theatre that the binary opposition between the 
spiritual and the material is problematized, allowing the possibility of 
considering a vision of objectivity that is embodied and situated and an idea 
of transcendence that is immanent and creative.  
 
Thus, the objective is to interpret the notion of spirituality in and through 
performance, in and through the performativity of ‘the body/ies’ in theatre, 
in and through a self torn between aspirations and illusions; in other words, 
in that space between fiction and reality, chaos and order, the metaphysical 
and the physical, matter and energies, forces and spirit without feeling 
compelled to look for a resolution to their apparent contradictions.  
It is my suggestion that these contradictions are the foundations of the 
theatrical apparatuses that these artists construct to contain what cannot 
be otherwise contained. All the performances analysed here deals with these 
contradiction/s, acknowledging the complex processes of entanglement 
through which what we call ‘the material world’ comes into existence in 
multiplicity, complexity, numinosity, and imagination. As the physicist 
Karen Barad argues, matter, like meaning: 
 
is not an individually articulated or static entity. Matter is not little 
bits of nature, or a blank slate, surface, or site passively awaiting 
signification; nor is it an uncontested ground for scientific, 
feminist, or Marxist theories. (…) Matter is not immutable or 
passive. It does not require the mark of an external force like 
culture or history to complete it. Matter is always already an 
ongoing historicity (2008, 139). 
 
How we engage with such a mutable materiality that shifts forms according 
to the measures and instruments that we have at our disposal, is a question 
that deals not only with knowledge production, cognitive process and 
perception, but also with the notion of the unknown, or better still, the non-
yet-known.  
 
The un-known, the body and the script 
 
The American Philosopher John Caputo, building his theories on the work of 
Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida, defends the idea that there is no 
unique, stable truth to be discovered, but rather that the project of 
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knowledge continuously reminds us of the impossibility of achieving a 
singular, definitive answer or reaching a final point of arrival (Caputo, More 
2-3). In his book More Radical Hermeneutics he endorses a view of 
knowledge that resists fixity and permanence and necessarily is embedded 
in non-knowing (Caputo 2000, 3). However, according to him, it is exactly 
this sense of impossibility, hovering around the project of knowledge, that 
renders necessary the application of temporary, shared categorizations of 
reality, and that at the same time maintains the momentum for further 
engagement, interpretations and revisions (2000, 5). This is to say that, 
although a certain kind of structural blindness is always at play, it is the 
same condition of non-knowing that: 
  
keep[s] us open to innumerable mutations and unforeseeable 
possibilities, to incalculable ways of being and knowing, doing and 
seeing, exposed to potentialities of which we cannot presently 
conceive, to things improbable and incomprehensible, 
unimaginable and unplannable (Caputo 2000, 6). 
  
From this perspective knowledge requires an on-going research attitude, a 
continuous development of previous positions through adjustments, (Caputo 
2000, 7-8),4 as well as a passion for the impossible, the visionary and the 
‘other’. The task of maintaining this passion alive is an existential quest for 
the ability to hold exposure and instability; for the will to disentangle from 
the old instruments through which we know the world and consequently 
judge it, and for the desire to embrace new ones; for the curiosity to allow 
the ‘other’ to enter and transform us; and for the strength to imagine what is 
not yet manifested amongst the pressures of ordinary life and the 
constraints of social, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
 
Knowing and navigating the world is in fact rarely a neutral undertaking; it 
is indeed a process that is constantly informed by society as a whole, in its 
forms of representation and reinforcement, its own values and beliefs, as 
well as its epistemological apparatuses, ontological belief systems and 
naturalised assumptions. For example, Michel Foucault focuses on the 
social apparatuses which configure and perpetuate through specific scripts 
of individual self-identity and self-judgement collective moral discourses 
which constitute the binary understanding of what is good or bad, 
punishable or rewardable, mad or sane, empirical or metaphysical. Foucault 
attends to the processes through which we embody and are constituted by 
the discourses that make up our culture, and analyses the apparatuses that 
this culture has produced to reinforce (and inscribe) its specific scripts on 
individuals and collectives (Rux 1988, 10-15).  
 
The question of embodying a cultural script is critical for the logic of this 
book as it is directly related to the function that technologies of the self – 
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spiritual practices - may have in terms of disentangling the self from some of 
these given patterns, and the role that performance can play in this regard. 
Judith Butler, for example, focuses her attention on the question of gender 
and employs the notion of performativity to argue that gender is performed 
through the repetition of stylized acts in time (1988, 519). She argues that 
gender is real only to the extent that it is performed through ‘bodily 
gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds [that in time] 
constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self’ (Ibid). She does not deny 
the factuality of sexuality in the body’s materiality, but she re-conceives it as 
‘distinct from the process by which the body comes to bear cultural 
meanings’ (1988, 520). To become a ‘woman’ or a ‘man’ is, accordingly, to 
conform to a historical script or idea of what a woman or a man culturally 
comprises, in doing so sustaining and confirming through embodiment and 
behaviour a culturally inherited script.  
 
The physicist Karen Barad embeds the concept of performativity and the 
metaphor of the script even further into embodiment and more generally 
into matter. Drawing from Butler and Foucault’s discourses on constructed 
identities, she links these to the theories of the physicist Niels Bohr to 
reinforce the theoretical tool of performativity: 
 
for science studies and feminist theory endeavours alike (…) [to] 
allow matter its due as an active participant in the world’s 
becoming (2007, 136). 
 
She challenges the linguistic faith in the power of words to represent pre-
existing things and proposes that words are performative in the sense that 
they do things because they are part of the world with which they engage 
(2007, 133). Furthermore, she ‘provides an understanding of how discursive 
practices matter’ (2007, 136), contributing to the idea that not only our 
perception of things as they are, but also our descriptions of them, are 
specific material configurations of reality. In other words, thinking, 
observing, and theorizing are all ‘practices of engagement with, and as part 
of, the world in which we have our being’ (Barad 2007, 133). This entails 
questioning discursive practices that give to language and culture their 
agency (Barad 2007, 132) but consider matter to be fixed and unimportant 
in the world’s becoming. In this way, therefore, she argues that matter, in its 
complexity, is an active participant (2007, 136) in the formation of the self 
and its categories of discrimination. In other words, discourses are specific 
material configurations and, vice versa, matter in its complexity informs 
discourses.  
 
Barad’s hypothesis is not an isolated research undertaking as other scholars 
engage with similar issues. For example, the political theorist Jane Bennett 
argues something similar when she talks about the ‘vitality’ of matter and 
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things (2010, viii). Bennett’s philosophical account calls for a theory ‘of 
action and responsibility that crosses the human-non human divide’ 
(Bennett 2010, 24), opening the idea of human agency to a complexity of 
other non-human things (2010, 23). She envisions a concept of agency 
‘distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field (…) the confederate 
agency of many striving macro- and micro-actants’ (Ibid.).5 They include a 
variety of factors from personal memories, intentions, contentions to 
intestinal bacteria, eyeglasses, and blood sugar, as well as many other 
‘actants such as the air in the room, the noises, the things used such as 
plastic computer keyboards’ (Ibid.), the weather, the clothes worn, the food 
eaten and their micro-entities.  
 
Following this line of logic, possibilities for self-transformation and 
discoveries are to be found in subtle, embodied forms of subversive 
enactments (Butler 1988, 520) that, by manipulating the material elements 
composing and informing what we know and who we are, aim at breaking 
the script to which the self is subjected. In this way one encounters what is 
outside or beneath the culturally known and activates the possibility of 
discovering a self that is constituted by a plurality of human and non-
human relationships. In this context ‘the body’, in its complex material 
constituents, acts as a ‘super’ or ‘extra’ human tool through which the self 
can manipulate how the self perceives others (Petersen 2006, 97) and the 
surrounding environment, as well as the terms through which these 
relationships come into place and become manifested.  
 
Anna Furse in the essay ‘Being Touched, encourages an engagement with 
the body to ‘shift, or at least modulate power relations (…), hierarchies of 
power, ego, strength, gender and other roles’, historically inherited and 
stored in our bodies (2011, 54). This may also entail the project of 
reconsidering what the body is, where its boundaries are set and how its 
material configurations are interpreted. The body, therefore, in its broader 
material manifestations, becomes the starting point through which to invent 
and discover a new ecology of relations for the self and the ‘other(s)’ and 
from which to reinvent the project of spirituality. In this regard Jane 
Bennett emphasizes how the cultural assumption of: 
 
an intrinsically inanimate matter may be one of the impediments 
to the emergence of more ecological and more materially  
sustainable modes of production and consumption [both within 
and outside our bodies] (2010, ix). 
 
Bennett’s idea of our bodies as assemblages of life forms and forces, and 
Barad’s theory of matter, brought to my attention the fact that, as the 
Buddhist scholar Alan Wallace argues, introspective traditions such as 
Buddhism consider ontological relativism to be the fundamental nature of 
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reality, and that ‘perceptual objects [and their dividedness] exist only 
relative to the means by which they are perceived or measured’ (2000). The 
state of samādhi is referred to as the state of being self-immersed in the field 
of indifferentiation where gender, class, nationality lose their meaning and 
where material distinctiveness dissolves (Wallace 2012) in performativity 
and multiplicity. This is the state of self-immersion in the proliferation and 
intricate dance of human and non-human contingencies and 
conglomerations; and it is the numinosity of this process that this book 
intends to highlight, as well as a co-mingling that as Bennett argues has 
become harder and harder to ignore (2010, 31).  
 
Most of the practices employed by the artists chosen for this publication are 
types of introspective technologies intended to offer to the practicing self or 
the participants an opening toward this kind of undifferentiated and plural 
sense of self; they modify, through the manipulation of the body, the 
modalities by which the self orients itself in the world (Csordas 1994, 5).  
The attention is often shifted from the performer to the participant and vice 
versa according to the angle of analysis chosen. This allows a moving 
interpretative lens that each time produces specific frames of analysis and a 
more complex understanding of how each technology of the self produces 
meaning.  
 
Technologies of the self and how the self acknowledges the non-self 
 
In over twenty-five years of historical enquiry into insanity, deviancy, 
criminality, and sexuality, Foucault concerned himself with technologies of 
power and domination, ‘whereby the self has been objectified through 
scientific inquiry (…) and through what he termed “dividing practices”’ 
(Martin, Gutman and Hutton 1988, 3). However, toward the end of his life, 
he turned his attention to a different aspect of the self, that is the process of 
its own self-subjectification.  
 
With both technologies of domination and technologies of self-
subjectification we are confronted with technological apparatuses and 
methodologies that do not necessarily imply the employment of machinery, 
but rather, from the etymological meaning of the Greek term tekhnologia, 
the application of systematic treatments. It is legitimate, therefore, to 
consider ‘technology’ in terms of repetitive activities and behaviours: a 
specific methodical organization and arrangement of activities employed to 
modify how individuals, and whole societies, perceive themselves.  
 
Foucault identifies four categories of technologies which humanity has 
historically applied to itself (Foucault 1988, 18):  
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1. Technologies of production that determine, through the production 
and the manipulation of things, social order and self-identity;  
2. Technologies of sign systems that, through the use of symbols in 
communicative processes, operate cultural processes of identification; 
3. Technologies of power that, through processes of systematic policing, 
‘determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to (…) an 
objectification of the subject’; 
4. Technologies of the self which allow individuals to effect by their own 
means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so 
as to transform themselves and attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality (Foucault 1988, 18).  
 
Systematic treatments related to spiritual practices that can be classified 
within the category of ‘technologies of the self’ include engaging for long 
periods of time in actions such as contemplating the inward and outward 
movements of the breath, repeating the same mantra or prayer, enduring 
standing or sitting in stillness, living in isolation and silence, fasting, 
contemplating the subtle movements of thoughts, repeating the same 
movement or action for extenuating periods of time, ecstatic dance and so 
on. Foucault focused his attention on tracing these ‘techniques of self-
formation from the early Greeks to the Christian age’ (Martin, Gutman and 
Hutton 1988, 5), whereas in the specificity of this context I am looking at 
techniques originating in religious contexts of various historical periods that 
are employed by performance artists within the cultural context of 
contemporary western societies. This implies a need to contextualize these 
technologies within the discourses of contemporary performance in western 
countries such as United States and Europe, to examine how they are 
negotiated in these contexts, and to take into consideration the cultural 
impact that they have on a sense of self that is highly informed by 
technological advancement.6  
 
In philosophical terms, what constitutes the self in post-industrial societies 
is debated. Some theorists argue that the self is constructed by social 
structures that determine its identity and perception; others celebrate the 
authenticity of self-creativity and agency (Elliott 2010, 13). In terms of 
methodological approaches there is no settled ground to refer to, as some 
consider the self an object that can be studied without references to the 
interpretations that individuals make, while others think that it cannot be 
adequately studied in isolation from these interpretations (Elliott 2010, 9). 
Questions of agency and structure, objectivity and subjectivity, are the main 
sites of contention in relation to a self that, depending on the models 
employed, can have its horizon of agentic possibilities expanded or shrunk.  
 
 10 
Having said this, one can argue that contemporary, post-industrial societies 
have contributed to postmodern interpretations of a self shattered in 
multiple directions and negotiated by the interpersonal demands of a multi-
layered everyday life (Elliott 2010, 85). The so called ‘postmodern self’ is in 
fact without fixed identity, being fragmented and in flux, entangled in an 
endless process of self-creation by new technological transformations, 
multiple online identities, consumer lifestyles, and global population 
movements that construct and deconstruct on a daily basis its own sense of 
identity. It is the product of an endless number of self-reflections that 
produce fragmentation, multiplicity and discontinuity.  
 
French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in their collaborative 
book Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, defend fragmentation and 
the metaphoric idea of schizophrenic identities as forms of resistance to the 
‘oedipalized territorialities’ (Delueze and Guattari 1984, xvii) of institutions 
such as family, church, school, nation, party. They defend processes of 
randomness, decentred and disconnected identities, positing a ‘multiplicity 
of selves (…) as possible subjective sources for alternative social 
arrangements’ (Elliott 2010, 148). Furthermore, they argue for a fluctuating 
condition of existence where ‘the self and non-self, outside and inside, no 
longer have any meaning whatsoever’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 2). In 
that space of indeterminacy the so-called schizophrenic self penetrates into 
the realm of deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1984, 35) where 
representation ceases to be objective and ‘becomes subjective, infinite – that 
is to say, imaginary – [and] effectively los[es] all consistency’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1984, 305). 
 
Nonetheless, the promotion of a deterritorialized self, disconnected from 
structures and their ideologies, incapable of sympathizing with the values 
offered by specific familial, religious, national or political belief systems, is 
viewed by various scholars as disengaging individuals from political 
involvement. For example Amelia Jones in her book Seeing Differently: A 
History and Theory of Identification and the Visual Arts (2012), points out 
how discourses on ‘post’ identity have reshaped, undermined and obscured: 
  
50 years of intense struggle on the part of civil rights, feminist, 
and other activists operating under the premises of twentieth-
century identity politics (Jones 2002, xx).  
 
The sociologist Anthony Elliott, in his book Concepts of the Self (2010), 
denounces the fact that postmodern defenders of a multiplicity of selves 
ignore the emotional damage and psychic pain with which schizophrenia is 




a naïve celebration of the multiplicity of selves, fragmented 
identities, narcissistic personality disorders and schizophrenia as 
possible subjective sources for alternative social arrangements 
(2010, 148). 
 
Having said this, it is worth emphasizing that the question of shattered 
identities-in-process, proposed by postmodern discourses, are themselves 
constitutive of a reaction to political and cultural discourses.  
 
In this regard, the psychologist James Hillman argues that we are still 
guided by a bias toward the one, by the idea that unity is an advance over 
multiplicity and diversity (1989, 38). Hillman points out that, although the 
post-industrial self is constantly entangled in multiplicity, the underlining 
myth informing our sense of self is still constrained within the myth of 
singularity that is represented in Jungian terms by the archetypical, 
monotheistic symbol of Christ (1989, 41) or Mohamed, or any other 
symbolic figure at the root of monotheistic religions. It is the myth of the 
monotheistic self that, according to Hillman, represents the symbolic script 
still dominating the conceptions of contemporary self (1989, 41), and fuels 
our fears and resistance toward multiplicity. Therefore, he proposes a 
polytheistic psychology of the self capable of reflecting more accurately: 
  
the illusions and entanglements of the soul, even if it satisfies less 
the popular vision of individuation from chaos to order, from 
multiplicity to unity, and where the health of wholeness has come 
to mean the one dominating the many (1989, 40).  
 
He goes on to argue that what constitutes the self should not be found in a 
monotheistic idea of wholeness but in the process of ‘gathering each 
fragment according to its own principle’ (1989, 39).  
 
Hillman’s polytheistic self, although resembling the schizophrenic ideal of 
Deleuze and Guattari, does not aim to deconstruct the myth of Oedipus 
alone but rather all of the myths underlining monotheistic religions. This is 
realized, he suggests, by substituting, for example, the archetype of the 
Virgin Mary with a plurality of mythological figures like Artemis, 
Persephone, Athena, Aphrodite as more adequate ‘psychological 
backgrounds to the complexity of human nature’ (1989, 39). In other words, 
he targets all those symbols that ‘present themselves in descriptions which 
dominate through unification’ (Ibid.), and in doing so impede the emergence 
of a flexible and plural self, capable of self-transformation and 
compassionate acts toward others. 
 
Whatever way we look at it, any engagement with the exploration of the 
notion of the self in post-industrial societies ‘denote[s] a concern with the 
subjectivity of the individual’ (Elliott 2010, 14) and its relation to its social 
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structures and their political and social operations. The self seems to 
emerge through a two-way movement, from the outside to the inside and, 
vice versa, from the inside to the outside: 
  
always subject to or of something (…), [standing] at the 
intersection of general truth and shared principles (Mansfield 
2000, 3).  
 
However, Mansfield suggests, the question as to whether the nature and the 
qualities of these principles and truths determine or are determined by the 
self will continue to be a contested territory (Ibid.). 
 
This two-way process applies as well as to the micro-cosmos of the 
theatrical apparatuses constructed by the artists under scrutiny here: to the 
relationships established between the beheld and the beholder, and to the 
perceptual construct of the self that emerges from each singular 
performance. However, whether this movement is an ontological fact or a 
temporary condition given by the specificity of contextual apparatuses 
remains an open question. 
 
Theatrical apparatuses of experimentation 
 
Theatrical apparatuses of experimentation are understood in this context as 
operating physical conditions established in such ways that certain aspects 
of the environment are selected and controlled into systems within which to 
carry out experiments. According to the philosopher Giorgio Agamben, 
Foucault’s notion of apparatus (dispositif) is related to his concern with 
‘what he calls “governmentality” or the “government of men”’ (2009, 1). The 
term ‘apparatus’ is used to refer to the heterogeneous ensemble of 
‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault 1980, 194) which are employed to 
govern, direct and control a society. It is possible to summarise Foucault’s 
model in four points: firstly, an apparatus is the network that is established 
between linguistic and non-linguistic elements; secondly, each apparatus 
has a ‘concrete strategic function and is always located in a power relation’; 
thirdly, it ‘appears at the intersection of power relations and relations of 
knowledge’ (Agamben 2009, 2-3); and fourthly, its nature is to have a 
dominant strategic function (Foucault 1980, 195).  
 
What is particularly interesting here is that, according to Foucault, an 
apparatus is essentially strategic in manipulating the relations of forces 
within a specific system (Foucault 1980, 196). These relations can be moved 
in a particular direction, blocked, stabilized or multiplied in order to 
accomplish specific objectives (Ibid.) and in accordance with the specific 
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knowledge from which it is constructed. An apparatus is, therefore, always 
linked to ‘certain limits of knowledge that arise from [the system] and, to an 
equal degree, conditions it’ (Ibid.). Both knowledge and apparatuses 
constitute the specificity of the systems in place and, vice versa, the 
specificity of the systems influences both knowledge and apparatuses. This 
is to say that the relation of forces that emerges in a system is produced by 
a reciprocal loop of influence that re-informs and re-enforces, in time, all of 
the participative constituents, their perceptions and description of what is 
real and not real. 
 
Applying this model to performance implies that performances are 
interpreted as systems controlled through theatrical apparatuses and 
strategies that maintain and govern the relation of forces between the 
performer or object of attention and audience, within certain boundaries. In 
the specificities of the works analysed in this book, the elements that 
constitute their apparatuses are: the performance or installation space; the 
performer or object’s presence in relation to participants/spectators; the 
technology of the self-employed; the management of time and the 
performance’s rules and regulations. Hence, depending on how these 
elements are played out and engage with each other, the relations of forces 
between the performer and the audience will operate differently.  
 
In considering these performances as systems governed through theatrical 
apparatuses I am suggesting a certain conception of performance that 
recalls the scientific laboratory: a highly controlled environment where a 
certain condition is kept stable in order to experiment, in isolation, with the 
behaviours of certain phenomena. For example, Laib, in presenting pollen 
under specific circumstances and quantities, reveals certain qualities of the 
material that would be otherwise imperceptible. Indeed, as it will be 
extensively explicated in each respective chapter, in their own way, all 
artists explored here have associations with the scientific laboratory as a 
metaphor for the experimental paradigm. However, their interventions by 
employing or being inspired by religious practices are often critical of the 
dominant scientific model as the only reference for knowledge’s production. 
Performance is therefore suggested as the locus for experimenting with 
technologies of the self and types of experiences in introspection, and in 
ways that are different from both the dominant scientific model and the 
religious creeds from which the practices of inspiration originated.  
 
It is worth noticing that neuroscientists are currently employing 
sophisticated technological apparatuses to explore the effects of meditative 
practices on the brain. However, as neuroscientist Peter Malinowsky argues, 
to look at images of the brain responding to meditative practices can never 
be mistaken for the experience itself (2012).7 The representation of the 
experience is wholly different from the embodied experience itself. 
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Malinowsky admits that the only way to explore the complexity of the realm 
of experience, as a whole, would be a dialogical model comprehensive of 
introspective methods, experiential approaches and the third person model 
of conventional science. Nonetheless, introspective methods and experiential 
approaches are still perceived as too self-referential and therefore outside 
the limits of what has been established as a rigorous experimental/scientific 
approach to knowledge (Malinowsky 2012).  
 
However, feminist philosophers of science are problematizing some of these 
premises. For example according to Barad, the third person model of 
western science is not immune to the problem that an apparatus, by 
containing an action within a closed system, always constitutes ‘specific 
reconfigurings of the world that (…) iteratively reconfigure spacetimematter’ 
(Barad 2017, 142). Consequently, because apparatuses are never neutral, 
the hypothesis proposed is that the primary epistemological unit of the 
scientific model is not a fixed ontological reality either. In other words, the 
existence of the independent entities of observer/subject and 
observed/object, on which the third person model is based, is, according to 
Barad, a constructed condition produced by the particular apparatus 
devised for the specificity of the experiment undertaken (2008, 133). Barad’s 
main argument suggests that what we understand as reality, with its 
apparently inherent boundaries and properties, is actually ontologically 
undetermined. Boundaries between things are temporary and their 
differences emerge through relation (Ibid.).  
 
One of the main contributions of Barad’s theory is the neologism of ‘intra-
action’ which proposes that things, objects and humans do not have pre-
existing relations. This differs from the notion of interaction that 
necessitates existing entities as a precondition of their relation. Intra-action 
is, therefore, a coming into relation while becoming into being, a 
performative process wherein separateness emerges together with material 
configurations and their meanings (Ibid.). Thus objects and subjects emerge 
in their meaning through relational processes. These processes entail 
performing local resolutions or differences, the boundaries of which are set 
according to the specificity of the resolution constituted. Therefore, these 
specific conditions/relations allow the emergence of agencies capable of 
performing other functional, local resolutions and differences on what was 
previously indeterminate.  
 
Applying this model to the theatrical apparatuses studied here, one can 
propose that they operate specific, functional, local resolutions within the 
space in which they are located, constituting specific relational conditions of 
experimentation between the observer/spectator and the 
observed/performer. Yet, these apparatuses are constructed to render 
palpable the indeterminate nature of this relationship by manipulating 
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perception and therefore destabilizing the fixity of its points of reference. In 
other words, they open the way for processes of concealment and revelation 
of perceptual possibilities that: 
 
make visible the invisible, confuse bones with skin, substance with 
secondary effects (…) violat[ing] the hierarchy of social and 
corporal spaces distanced into front and back, into illusion and 
reality (Lyotard 1984, 106).  
 
These are contexts that seem to invite spectators to inhabit and explore the 
imaginary, the ‘other’, the unknown, the unexpected, that which 
  
interrupts the customary course of events, (…) removes the 
conditions and obligations of everyday life [and touches on] the 





Creativity and the Numen Praesens 
 
The theologian Rudolf Otto, in his phenomenological analysis of the religious 
experience, describes this breach of ordinary perception as the encounter 
with the numen praesens, the ‘wholly other’, an object whose nature, 
transcending the known, breaks the boundaries of the conceivable and 
provokes, in the individual or collective encountering it, unique types of 
emotions (1958, 10). Otto described this in paradoxical terms by employing 
the Latin mysterium tremendum and mysterium fascinans to characterize the 
numinous experience as a feeling-response bringing and holding together 
contrasting inner responses such as terror and ecstasy (Luft 2012, 478).  
 
The mysterium tremendum is depicted by Otto with dramatic emphasis, for 
example as ‘the awe-aweful’ akin to ‘religious dread’ (1984, 14), the horror of 
Pan ‘with its queer perversion’ (Ibid.), the reaction to ‘something uncanny’, 
the weird, or the ‘tremor’, elicited by the encounter with what is regarded as 
unfamiliar or ‘wholly other’ (1984, 16).8 On the contrary, the mysterium 
fascinans is portrayed as the ‘absolute fascination’ (Otto 1984, 38) that 
William James describes as the ‘effect of some great orchestra, when all the 
separate notes have melted into one swelling harmony’ (Austin 1962, 66), 
the bliss, ‘the wonderfulness’ (Austin 1962, 32), ‘the rapture and the over-
abounding’ (Austin 1962, 38) feelings experienced by participating in 
something that lies beyond the singular and that the singular cannot fully 
possess.  
 
The two feelings described above coexist in Otto’s conception of the religious 
experience and contribute to his illustration of a gentle tide that: 
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may burst in sudden eruption up from the depths of the soul (…) 
[or] lead to the strangest excitements, to intoxicating frenzy, to 
transport, and to ecstasy. It may (also) become the hushed, 
trembling, and speechless humility of the creature in the presence 
of - whom or what? In the presence of that which is a mystery 
inexpressible (Otto 1958, 13). 
 
Carl Gustav Jung, one of the most prolific explorers of the idea of the 
numinous in secular terms, envisages the conceptual and experimental 
potentialities of the religious experience as conceived by Otto in the 
advancement of a psychoanalytical understanding of the processes through 
which individuals and collectives deal with unconscious and conscious 
contents (977, 7). His studies are directed toward the psychological 
processes that lead people to take into great consideration, in their daily 
lives, the influence of certain dynamic factors conceived by him as ‘powers’ 
(1977, 9). These powers, Jung suggested, can be named using different 
words like spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideas, ideals and may be considered 
invisible, meta-physical, abstract, or embodied, according to the cultural 
context in which they are experienced (1977, 5). In other words, Jung 
conceives of these powers as emerging and acquiring meaning and value 
according to the belief system in place in a specific context. 
 
As a result, Jung interprets Otto’s concept of the ‘wholly other’ not as an 
inherent quality of the object encountered by the subject, but rather as a 
subjective perceptual reaction of the self to the object (Jung 2006, 63-64).  
 
The literary scholar Sabine Coelsch-Foisner, in her analysis of the question 
of the numinous ethos in literature, endorses this perspective by validating 
the argument that the spiritual does not depend on supra-sensible entities 
but rather on a shift in perception or ‘a particular frame of mind and 
manner of apprehension’ (2002, 393). In particular she focuses on ‘the 
importance of distinguishing between the transcendent and the 
transcendental experience’ (Ibid.).9 In explaining this differentiation, she 
suggests that contrary to the transcendent, the transcendental constitutes a 
happening that ‘of necessity is tied to the objects [or subjects] of this world’ 
(Ibid.). Nevertheless, she goes on to argue that the self, experiencing 
something as numinous or ‘wholly other’, initiates a process of perceptive 
transformation during which ‘the objects of this world’ pass from being 
perceived as something experiential to something transcendent and ‘wholly 
other’ (Ibid.).  
 
I propose to describe this process as a cyclical reflexive movement from the 
outside (stimulus) to the inside (unconscious content) and to the outside 
again (the external stimulus is perceived differently): a dynamic looping 
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process of perceptual alteration that transforms the way the subject 
perceives the self and the surrounding environment.  
 
This idea is analogous to what the historian of religion Mircea Eliade 
designated in the book The Sacred and the Profane (1957) as ‘hierophanies’ 
or ‘the act of manifestation of the sacred’ (Eliade 1987, 11). He argues that: 
 
by manifesting the sacred, any object becomes something else, yet 
it continues to remain itself (…). A sacred stone remains a stone; 
apparently (or, more precisely, from the profane point of view), 
nothing distinguishes it from all other stones. But for those to 
whom a stone reveals itself as sacred, its immediate reality is 
transmuted into a supernatural reality (1987, 12). 
 
The philosopher Drew Dalton, in his book Longing for the Other, Levinas and 
Metaphysical Desire (2009), endorses this perspective and provides further 
insights into the characteristics of the spiritual experience, with particular 
interest in the relationship between the self and the numinous object. 
Developing further Otto’s discourse around the idea of the numinous object 
as ‘wholly other’, he points out, as others have done before him, that it is 
the self who conceives an object of this world as something ‘wholly other’ 
and transcendental. However, in returning to Otto’s idea that the object is 
also the carrier of an ‘overplus’ of meaning (1958, 230), he aims to 
emphasize the function of the object. Indeed, he proposes that it is the 
object that actually carries the overplus of meaning or excess of value, and 
is thus the initiator of the numinous experience. Therefore, this overplus 
held by the object expressing ‘too muchness’ (Ibid.) explodes the borders and 
limits of the ordered systems within which the self has set reality.  
 
Nonetheless, according to Dalton this overplus of meaning should not be 
interpreted as supernatural, but rather in terms of creativity and within 
culture (2009, 234). He argues that the numinous/spiritual experience is 
the locus and the fulcrum of the creative process ‘forged in the fires of the 
beyond being’ (Ibid.). Creativity emerges, he suggests, from a: 
  
breach within the phenomenal realm through which a new 
conception of that realm can be formulated. That is, as the tie 
within being to that which lies beyond being, the numinous seems 
to cast the phenomenal realm in a new light (Ibid.). 
 
In proposing the hypothesis that the religious/spiritual experience is the 
fulcrum of the creative process, Dalton also suggests a potential numinous 
value for the artistic object/presence/event (2009, 230-234). In doing so, he 
establishes a direct connection between creativity and numinosity, art and 
experimentation, letting the borders of their given categorizations blur, and 
 18 
enabling the possibility for a third dimension of encounter to emerge (2009, 
230).   
 
Homi Bhabha, in the essay ‘Aura and Agora: On Negotiating Rapture and 
Speaking Between’, effectively describes this condition in terms of a ceasura 
in everyday life between experience and knowing (1996, 8). He emphasizes 
its paradoxical qualities as the condition of a self experiencing the non-self, 
an experience that interrupts and breaks the processes of negotiation that 
characterize everyday life (1996, 10). He goes on to describe it as a state that 
has  
 
the capacity to reveal, [manifests in the ordinary] the almost 
impossible, attenuate limit where aura and agora overlap (…) in 
the unresolvable “side-by-sideness” of insight and insouciance in 
that uneasy space and time in between birth and death [that] 
opens a [different] space of survival (1996, 9).  
 
This type of emotion, suspending judgement, disrupts the capacity of the 
self to orient her/himself through the establishment of the binary opposites 
of good and bad, right and wrong, inside and outside, sacred and secular, 
reasonable and unreasonable, self and other.   
 
This is a sense of affective totality that occurs in a loop, in cycles of arising 
perceptual, emotional conditions within which the spectator and their object 
of reference lose certainty in space and time. According to the psychologist 
Ciarán Benson, this phenomenon is the perspective offered by certain 
attitudes and creative modus operandi of contemporary art that are included 
in the ‘negative path’ undertaken by the artists analysed here. Benson refers 
to this artistic attitude as the perspective of the ‘no points of view’ (2001, 
192-204). In his book The Cultural Psychology of Self: Place, Morality and Art 
in Human Worlds (2001), Benson argues that the modalities by which our 
psychological sense of being is located spatially and temporally depend on a 
series of doubled coordinates, such as: 
   
up/down, front/back, above/below, inside/outside, on/off, 
here/there, towards/away and now/then, but also I/you, 
us/them, is/is not, have/not have, yours/mine and for/against 
(2001, 194).  
 
He goes on to suggest that the modalities by which the coordinates and 
boundaries of self and other, and where each begins and ends, are 
determined and constructed ‘by our use of metaphors based on our 
language for physical location’ (2001, 194). In a similar fashion to Bhabha, 
Benson regards the arts as one of the core mediators of the perceptual 
processes through which the self knows and positions the other in relation 
to itself. According to him, the arts are the most ‘accomplished metaphorical 
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realm created by human beings’ (Ibid.) through which the individual self 
arrives at a mutual agreement with other selves not only about how and 
where their reciprocal boundaries are set, but also about how alternative 
perspectives and propositions can be found and created (2001, 195). 
 
Benson leads the reader through the fascinating journey of how spatial 
metaphors, such as medieval pictorial space or the development of linear 
perspective in the Renaissance, were coherently grounded in experiences 
that were physical, social and cultural (2001, 195-197).10 He goes on to 
propose contemporary developments of the ‘no point of view’ experience, and 
explains its cultural implications by looking specifically at the work of the 
artist James Turrell who, by exploring sensory deprivation in architecture, 
shifts the twofoldness of the pictorial to the ‘twofoldness of perception’ 
(2001, 199), rendering perceptible the experience of witnessing the 
processes through which we see.  
 
The condition of a self becoming conscious of its own perceptual processes, 
through which objects of this world acquire appearances, forms and 
eventually meaning, entails a shift in the focus of attention in regard to the 
coordinates through which the self looks for physical location from the 
outside to the inside (Benson 2001, 193). In other words, in this process the 
perceptual motor field, by which the self orients itself in a specific context 
where the dichotomies of I/you, inside/outside permeate the relationship 
between the subject and the object, is affected and destabilized. This shift 
occurs when a self immerses itself in introspective processes aimed at 
calibrating and manipulating the complex human biological apparatus of 
perception.  
 
When the apparatus is shifted in its complex material configurations, a new 
vision is potentially able to reach consciousness and reveal what was 
previously unknown within the known. Each of the performances analysed 
here reveal different possibilities for aspects of the real to emerge in 
difference and complexity. Each of them offer a different ecological order 
that in their specificities hold ontological and epistemological significance in 
modifying the position that the self occupies within the hierarchy of the 
possible. 
 
The spiritual emerges as intrinsically dependent on knowledge, the models 
established to achieve it, and their destabilizations. These models are linked 
to the apparatuses employed that in turn also determine what self-
knowledge is, its boundaries and limitations. It depends on the networks of 
communication, its cultural and social instruments and technologies of 
interpretation, whether self-knowledge, introspection and its introspective 
models of investigation have any place in the project of knowing, and if 
indeed the dimension of the spiritual has any value and role within it.  
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To expand this point further I refer to the theologian and religious studies 
scholar Melissa Raphael, and particularly her book Rudolf Otto and the 
Concept of Holiness (1997), which by articulating a feminist perspective of 
Otto’s conception of the numinous argues for a feminist approach to the 
processes by which the world is apprehended. Raphael pays attention to 
Otto’s emphasis on the differentiation between religious morality and the 
spiritual experience (1997, 8-10). More specifically, she employs an 
etymological approach to look at the term ‘holy’ and the meanings it has 
historically acquired in its various cultural developments and 
interpretations. Otto, for example, points out that, although the term holy ‘is 
a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the sphere of religion’ 
(1958, 5), it has been applied by transference to the sphere of ethics. In 
Otto’s view, this is an interpretative misunderstanding of the meaning of 
‘holy’, which originally ‘in Latin and Greek, in Semitic and other ancient 
languages, denote[d] first and foremost only [an] overplus’ of meaning (Ibid.). 
This overplus of meaning is always and inevitably situated somewhere 
beyond the rational and moral interpretation of the ‘completely good’, often 
associated with the idea of divine (numen).  
 
Departing from this aspect of Otto’s theory, Raphael reclaims a non-rational, 
non-discursive, non-linear, non-masculinist sense of the spiritual that is 
different from the fixed, often dogmatic schematization and moralization 
offered by religious creeds (1997, 8). She proposes a feminist sense that 
finds fertile ground in Otto’s conception of paradox and its complex and 
unsettling configurations of meaning-making (1996, 34). In doing so she 
problematizes interpretations tending to corral and order the spiritual within 
defined codes of behaviour informed by controlling, patriarchal, 
authoritative intentions, proposing instead an intuitive and feminine 
approach to the spiritual and consequently to its interpretations.  
 
This is a perspective that opens the spiritual to the pluralities of 
interpretations and experiences that this book aims to provide: the 
disclosing of opportunities for the spiritual and the numinous to occur in 
processes of transformation and persistent nomadism. Each of the theatrical 
apparatuses analyzed in the next chapters will determine the territories 
occupied by the known and the unknown according to their specificities, 
each time shifting and relocating the boundaries of what is contextualized 
here as the domain of the spiritual. Every single chapter is therefore a 
journey into a specific contextualization of this domain, a possible 
conceptual shape for this slippery territory to dwell. However, none of this 
journeys represents an arrival, but rather a temporary beginning from which 
hopefully new generative locations will emerge. 
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1 Both Deer Shelter Skyspace and Pollen from Hazelnut are installations that involve a degree of 
performance elements, and are therefore considered here within the paradigm of performance. 
2 Here I refer to the theories developed by Jerzy Grotowski (1933-1999) whereby art is conceived as ‘a 
practical means and also the form for processes of a spiritual nature’ 
(http://www.grotowski.net/en/encyclopedia/art-vehicle) 
3 In the last twenty years a growing body of scholarship dedicated to the relationship between the 
religious and the secular in art and performance has emerged together with an increasing interest in 
related topics. For example, in 2009 the Institute for the Study of Performance and Spirituality was 
established with its related online journal Performance and Spirituality. In the same year the New 
York-based journal of performance and art PAJ dedicated an entire section to this subject entitled 
“Art and the Spiritual”; and in 2011 at the IFTR Osaka conference, the ‘Performance, Religion and 
Spirituality Working Group’ had its founding meeting. In 2017 the international academic journal 
Performance, Religion and Spirituality launched its inaugural issue and the Centre for Performance 
Philosophy hosted the event: Spirit in a Materialist World: Bergson, Laban & the immanent spiritual. 
Examples of recent publications on these subjects include: Jung Yoon (2010) Spirituality in 
Contemporary Art : The Idea of the Numinous; Morgan, David Ed. (2010) Religion and material 
culture: the matter of belief; Gharavi, Lance Ed. (2012) Religion, theatre, and performance: acts of 
faith; James Elkins and David Morgan Eds. (2009); Claire Chambers, Simon W. Du Toit and Joshua 
Edelman Eds. (2013) Performing Religion in Public; and Daniel Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2013) Observing 
Theatre: Spirituality and Subjectivity in the Performing Art. Donnalee Dox (2016) Reckoning with 
Spirit in the Paradigm of Performance. Claire Maria Chambers (2017) Performance Studies and 
Negative Epistemology: Performance Apophatics. 
4 Here Caputo refers to Derrida’s sense of the secret as the irreducibility of ‘the other’ who always ‘sits 
in the spot we can never occupy, speaks from the point of view we cannot inhabit, presides over a 
secret we cannot share. (…) [This] means that the absolute secret, the structural not-knowing, enters 
into and is the condition of the “other”’ (Caputo, 2000, p. 8). 
5 An ‘actant is neither an object nor a subject but an “intervener” (…). Which by virtue of its particular 
location (…) makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the decisive force catalyzing an 
event.’ Actant is a ‘substitute for what in a more [human] subject-centered vocabulary is called agent’ 
(Bennett, 2010, p. 9). 
6 In this case I am referring to machinery and electronic equipment. 
7 Peter Malinowsky is involved in the Meditation and Mindfulness Research Group at Liverpool John 
Moores University (http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/mindfulness/). 
8 Here Otto acknowledges the mythology of Pan as the pagan roots of the mysterium tremendum in 
western consciousness. 
9 Transcendent: adj. ‘beyond or above the range of normal or physical human experience’, ‘surpassing 
the ordinary’, ‘existing apart from and not subject to the limitations of the material universe’. 
Transcendental: adj. ‘relating to the spiritual realm (…) (in Kantian philosophy) presupposed in and 
necessary to experience.’ Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Continually updated at http://www.oed.com/. 
10 In this regard the scholar Robert Wicks reminds the reader that Foucault in his book The Order of 
Things (1973) argued, similarly, that the famous painting Las Meninas (1656) by Diego Velazquez 
clearly displayed the mode of representation that dominated the thought of the 17th and 18th 
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